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EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY: 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF POLARIZATION AND DIVIDED 
GOVERNMENT IN A CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES 
Mike Kistner 
Abstract: Despite a wealth of literature on the causes of gridlock in Congress, there is a 
lack of comparative work at the state level exploring whether lawmaking in state 
legislatures functions similarly. Operating under a theoretical framework assuming 
polarization and divided government are the primary obstacles to legislative success, and 
controlling for majority seat share, I test the determinants of legislative productivity with 
an original dataset consisting of 31 states. I operationalize legislative productivity using 
a content analysis of editorials from each state during the 2009-2010 legislative sessions 
to identify pressing political issues, and then determine how many of these issues were 
addressed in some form of legislation during this period. Utilizing an improved measure 
of legislative productivity that weights issues by salience, I find that polarization’s effects 
on productivity are conditioned by the presence or absence of divided government; 
during instances of unified government, polarization increases productivity, while this 
effect is negated under divided government. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, much has been written about the failure of the political system to 
simply get things done.  The high profile government shutdown of 2013, budgetary 
fighting and delays in state legislatures, and an increasingly hostile partisan atmosphere 
have all contributed to what has been characterized in the media as a political crisis. As a 
2013 op-ed in the New York Times puts it, “the legislature has ceased to function” and 
claims that “what we're losing in the process isn't government -- it's democracy”.112  
 While such claims might appear to be dramatized, they do point to a current lack 
of understanding about when and why government is successfully able to pass laws. 
What makes some legislatures effective and leaves others mired in gridlock? Political 
science literature has grappled with this question for almost 130 years, dating back to 
Woodrow Wilson’s critical examination of the nation’s primary legislature, 
Congressional Government.  
 Despite the passage of time, a consensus has failed to emerge on the causes of 
political gridlock, despite a wealth of recent literature attempting to tackle the topic at the 
                                                
112 Reich 2013, A23 
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national level.113 There are numerous potential explanations, which include the effects of 
increasing polarization, the presence of divided government, and executive success or 
failure among others. Different authors espouse a belief that one or more such variables is 
the real cause, only to be rebutted by future research. Interestingly, a comparable 
literature at the subnational level has failed to develop, and there exists almost no 
multistate research to determine if state legislatures function (and fail to function) in 
similar ways to Congress.114 Currently, there exists no work examining both polarization 
and divided government – the two most important variables identified at the national 
level – that encompasses a majority of the states. 
 This paper attempts to address this absence. By taking my cues from (and 
improving on) a method of identifying legislative agendas that has been used at the 
national level, I create two measures of state legislative productivity (one which treats all 
issues equally, and one which weighs each by salience) and apply these to 31 states 
during the period from 2009-2010. Then, by utilizing a recently created dataset that 
quantifies the ideological position of every state legislator, I am able to operationalize 
polarization as well as divided government, in order to determine their effects. Finally, I 
examine the impact of divided government and polarization at the state level, controlling 
for seat share, in an attempt to come to a better understanding of the conditions under 
which state legislatures succeed and fail at their most basic duty, the passage of laws.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
American political scientists have long attempted to isolate what drives legislative 
productivity, whether by examining Congress or state legislatures. This venture presents 
a two-fold difficulty. The first part is determining what comprises legislative 
productivity. Some scholars have tackled the issue as a matter of how much important 
legislation passed. David Mayhew, in one of the most cited works on the subject, 
quantified gridlock in this manner.115 By looking at both contemporary commentary and 
retrospective judgments of what he termed “landmark” legislation, he was able to assign 
a raw score to congressional sessions to determine how productive or gridlocked each 
                                                
113 Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1992; Binder 1999; Jones 2001; Edwards et al. 1997; McCarty 
et al. 2007; Ilderton 2008 
114 But note Gray and Lowery 1995; Bowling and Ferguson 2001 
115 Mayhew 1991	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was. Others have looked at the converse, the amount of important legislation that did not 
pass.116 The limiting factor to such approaches is that these measures fail to take into 
account the differing agendas each session faced. For instance, moments such as the 
Second World War or the financial crisis of the late 1970s would seemingly provide a 
greater need (as well as opportunity) to pass legislation. An amount of legislation that 
would seem prodigious in less eventful times would then be expected. A more useful way 
to define productivity requires looking at a legislature’s responsiveness to the political 
needs of the time, taking such exigencies into account. 
Some have devised measures that attempt to consider the issues faced by each 
legislature, typically by framing legislative productivity as a fractional score, with the 
number of relevant issues serving as the denominator, and the number of issues actually 
addressed as the numerator. One way this has been accomplished is by using the number 
of bills that made it to a particular stage of the lawmaking process, in order to construct a 
theoretical legislative agenda.117 This approach, however, runs the risk of failing to take 
into account the relative importance of each bill. Hearkening back to the previously 
mentioned definition, if the goal is to determine how responsive a legislature is to 
political needs it is certainly not the case that every bill that makes it out of committee 
necessarily represents a potent issue. In addition, the number of bills introduced or 
reaching a certain level of visibility is in itself potentially related to how much party 
conflict is present, making the independent variable subject to endogeneity problems.  
Other researchers have come up with ways to take into account both the needs 
faced by legislatures when lawmaking, as well as determining a level of salience. Binder, 
in her 1999 work on gridlock in Congress,118 uses a content analysis of newspaper 
editorials to provide a legislative agenda of issues considered important enough for a 
newspaper of record to bring to attention, whether in support of an action or against. 
Kousser utilizes a similar approach at the single-state level.119 By setting a threshold of 
importance as well as determining agenda faced, this type of approach allows more 
meaningful comparisons to be made across time and location regardless of context. 
                                                
116 Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997 
117 Bowling and Ferguson 2001; Ilderton 2008; Jones 2001 
118 See also her book length treatment on the same subject (2003) 
119 Kousser 2010	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 The second difficulty in investigating legislative productivity is deciding (and 
disentangling) which variables contribute to successful lawmaking. The primary 
determinants that researchers have focused on can be broadly categorized as inter-
institutional conflict, or intra-institutional conflict. 
Inter-institutional conflict refers to the complicating effects that arise when the 
major players between one branch and another have distinct preferences. At its simplest, 
this can be viewed as divided control of government. When a president (or governor) is 
from one of the two major parties and one or both chambers of the legislature are 
controlled by the other party, does this present an obstacle to the passage of laws? In a 
Madisonian democracy of checks and balances, it would seem to make sense that when 
the two branches are controlled by actors with differing goals and interests, the process of 
lawmaking would be more difficult, requiring compromise, logrolling, and information 
sharing that isn’t an issue if all major players have similar goals.120 However, Mayhew, in 
a critical null finding, provided an analysis of 44 years of Congress that found no link 
between divided government and legislative productivity. Since then, numerous scholars 
have produced empirical evidence contrary to Mayhew’s findings pointing to divided 
government being an obstacle to legislative efficiency at the national level.121 
Alternatively, others have confirmed Mayhew’s results.122  
While less literature exists at the state level, the debate also seems to extend to the 
state legislatures. Though they only examine legislative activity in a single state, Kousser 
and Cummins both conclude that divided government presented a barrier to the passage 
of bills and budgets in California.123 Bowling and Ferguson examine all fifty states, 
measuring gridlock as a simple percentage of how many bills became laws and how 
many failed to, and find divided government to be a statistically significant factor.124 On 
the other hand, in examining legislative activity in 46 of the states, Gray and Lowery 
found a nonexistent relationship between divided governmental control and law 
                                                
120 Such a process also seems to be more likely to break down completely. For over thirty 
years, political scientists have observed that vetoes are more common under divided 
government both at the national (Rohde and Simon 1985) and state (Wiggins 1980) level. 
121 Binder 1999; Ilderton 2008; and Edwards, Barrett and Peake 1997 
122 Fiorina 1992; Jones 2001 
123 Kousser 2010; Cummins 2012 
124 Bowling and Ferguson 2001 
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passage.125 Despite widely differing results, all of these authors consider the presence of 
inter-institutional conflict an important point of analysis. 
The second primary lens through which to consider gridlock is intra-branch 
conflict; specifically, factors within the legislature that prevent it from functioning 
properly. This discussion has mostly centered on polarization, or the width of the 
ideological differences between the two parties.126 Why should polarization affect 
legislative productivity? For some, polarization’s effect is a general one; the more 
ideologically distant the members making up an institution, the less successful it will be. 
As Binder puts it, “The broader the distribution of preferences, the greater the likelihood 
that legislator’s goals will be incompatible, or at least the more difficult it will be to reach 
a suitable compromise.”127 Polarization, therefore, can pose individual level difficulties, 
but perhaps the greatest threat of polarization is the conflict it encourages in the parties. 
As the theory of conditional party government suggests, parties in a legislature that are 
further apart ideologically have more incentive to strengthen party government and 
oppose the other party more vigorously.128 Logically, as polarization increases, the 
minority party will have more incentive to oppose the majority party’s actions, 
complicating the passage of laws.129  
 However, it should be noted that the effects of polarization on the legislative 
process may differ based on institutional factors. Due to a number of blocking tactics 
available for the minority party to use in the United States Senate (filibuster, legislative 
holds, non-germane amendments), researchers have noted that a highly divided Senate 
may suffer more under polarization than the House does.130 It has even been suggested 
that due to the relative ease with which a House majority can pass an agenda, the 
                                                
125 Gray and Lowery 1995 
126 But note Gray and Lowery 1995 as well as Bowling and Ferguson 2001, who suggest 
that the proliferation of interest groups and the conflict between them is significant too. 
127 Binder 1999, 521 
128 Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1996 
129 Worth noting, however, Dodd and Schraufnagel (2008) suggest that due to increased 
competitive pressure and intraparty cohesion, polarization might have a curvilinear 
relationship with legislative productivity, where the ideal amount is moderate 
polarization, and too far to either extreme results in diminishing returns. In my analysis, I 
take into account this possibility. 
130 Sinclair 2008; Jones 2001 
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increased ideological cohesion that comes with polarization may make the House more 
productive.131 In fact, others have suggested that polarization can perhaps counter-
intuitively have positive effects on the lawmaking process. Dodd and Schraufnagel have 
suggested that due to intraparty cohesion, increased competitive pressure, and legislator 
civility, polarization might have a curvilinear relation with legislative productivity, where 
too little polarization can be as harmful as too much.132 Likewise, when one takes the 
conditional party government theory to its logical conclusion, while increased 
polarization might increase the incentives for parties to draw closer together and oppose 
each other more vigorously, it also might imply that if polarization is paired with large 
enough legislative majorities to prevent minority interference, the increased cohesion and 
incentives for the majority party might lead to greater productivity. Thus, it’s important 
to take majority party seat control into account as a potential explanatory variable as well. 
While polarization may have both positive and negative effects on legislative 
productivity, insofar as it is a matter of pitting the majority party against the minority 
party, the balance of power between the two remains a critical factor. 
 Notably, few have considered the confluence of polarization and divided 
government. Polarization’s effects may be tampered by whether interparty bargaining is 
required between a governor and all or part of a legislature. Conversely, if polarization 
does enhance productivity in some manner, it seems much more likely to occur when the 
governorship and the legislature are controlled by the same party. McCarty hypothesizes 
this precise relationship at the national level.133 
  These three variables are not a comprehensive list, as other possible factors in 
legislative productivity have also been investigated.134 However, these are the primary 
potential explanations that scholars have focused on thus far, coming to few undisputed 
conclusions. 
                                                
131 Ilderton 2008	  
132 Dodd and Schraufnagel 2008 
133 McCarty 2007 
134 For instance, legislative professionalism (Gray and Lowery 1995; Clarke 1998), or 
extra-institutional constraints such as having an initiative process (Cummins 2012; Hicks 
2013).	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 In light of this, a number of things are clear. First, such contradictory results at all 
levels on the relationship between both inter- and intra-institutional conflict and 
legislative productivity leave us with a muddled picture on how such factors affect the 
lawmaking process. Any further research into the phenomenon of gridlock can only help 
clarify what is now a disputed area. Secondly, while the effects of divided government 
have been studied at the state level in a comparative context, there is no current 
equivalent research concerning the effects of polarization on legislative activity in the 
states. As Layman, Carsey and Horowitz detail at the end of their summary on political 
polarization, “particularly helpful would be comparative work at both the subnational and 
cross-national levels, where variations in policy, partisan, institutional, and cultural 
contexts may shape the beneficial or harmful consequences of party polarization.”135 
Considering this, the benefits are numerous of a multi-state examination of legislative 
productivity taking both inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflict into account; 
not only will it help illuminate the role of polarization in how legislatures function at the 
state level, but it also allows an evaluation of how divided government and polarization 
work as variables across a number of varying institutional and environmental contexts, in 
a way that looking at Congress or a single state alone does not allow. If inter- and intra-
institutional conflict has a universal effect, a study looking at a large cross-section of US 
states should bring us closer towards properly determining those effects. This paper 
attempts to address this gap in the literature by systematically looking at the relative 
influence of these two factors, and presents evidence that at the state level that both have 
significant (though conditional) effects on legislative productivity. 
METHODOLOGY 
 In order to evaluate these claims, it is necessary to operationalize legislative 
productivity, polarization, and divided government. The most difficult step is coming up 
with a valid measure of legislative productivity during 2009-2010, the time period under 
examination.  
Attempts to come up with such a measurement in previous multistate research 
have primarily utilized a simple measure of total bill passage rate.136 The problem with 
                                                
135 Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006, 105 
136 Gray and Lowery 1995; Bowling and Ferguson 2001 
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such an approach is that simply taking the passage rate of all bills mandates the inclusion 
of a large number of minor legislative actions, as well as failing to capture whether or not 
a state legislature addressed what were considered the important political issues at the 
time.  
Instead, my measure of legislative productivity draws from Sarah Binder’s 
methodology in “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock.”137 Binder measured gridlock 
by going through the editorial pages of The New York Times, coding the policy demands 
of every editorial mentioning Congress, the House, or the Senate. She then created a 
measure of gridlock by taking the number of issues that failed to result in the passage of 
laws, and turning it into a percentage, with the total number of issues discussed in the 
editorial pages representing the denominator. She decides to only include issues with four 
or more editorial mentions in her analysis, to provide a floor for salience.138 
 The benefit of such an approach is that it focuses on what political commentators 
at the time deemed important enough to discuss publicly, rather than merely looking at all 
bills considered as other researchers have done. This comes closer to the real concern 
when discussing legislative productivity: determining which legislatures can most 
effectively respond to the political necessities of the time. For example, an average state 
might pass 800 new laws per year.139 On the other hand, my content analysis of 
newspaper editorials turned up an average of 29 unique issues for each state which were 
considered important enough to discuss in an editorial.  
However, while Binder’s method recognizes this importance threshold by 
examining only those issues salient enough to be discussed in the media, it fails to take 
into account the relative importance of each issue once the threshold has been passed. A 
better measure would be one that is able to distinguish between issue importance at an 
interval level (rather than treat all issues past an arbitrary point of salience the same), and 
incorporate that into a legislative productivity score. 
                                                
137 The use of this method at the state level is not without precedent; in his single state 
analysis of gridlock in California, Kousser (2010) uses a similar measure as Binder to 
draw conclusions on the effects of polarization.	  
138 In both her 1999 and 2003 works, she does run the tests with different threshold 
levels, with mostly the same results. 
139 MSNBC 2011 
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 In order to accomplish this, I go through each of the 31 states, and using a 
newspaper of record for each state (choosing the newspaper with the largest circulation 
available from two online databases140), I analyze every unsigned editorial containing the 
term “state legislature”, or alternatively, the specific name for the state (for example, 
searching in The Chicago Tribune for Illinois using “General Assembly”). I then create a 
dataset listing all the unique issues, including the number of editorials each issue are 
mentioned in throughout the two year period.141 Following this, I utilize websites 
maintained by the individual state legislatures themselves, contemporary news reports, 
and Lexis-Nexis to determine which of the issues were addressed in some manner in a 
bill that passed through both chambers and was signed into law. I make no attempt to 
judge the quality of the laws, or how closely they came to an ideal version that either the 
editorial staff at the newspaper or legislators at the statehouse wanted. Rather, it is simply 
a measure of whether the legislature was able to pass a law that was closely related to the 
specific problem identified in the editorial pages.  
Using this, I derive two measures, depending on whether the unit of analysis is a 
unique issue, or an issue mention, counting each mention of an issue in a different 
editorial separately. Table 1 provides the average number of unique issues and issue 
mentions per state. While the mean number of mentions each issue received was only 1.8, 
there was significant variation. At the high end, one issue was mentioned in 22 separate 
editorials over the two-year period.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Unique Issues and Issue Mentions Per State. 
 Mean Low High Standard Dev. 
Unique Issues 28.5 11 69 31.0 
Issue Mentions 52.0 12 118 14.8 
    
 
N=31 
 
                                                
140 ProQuest National Newspapers Premiere and Lexis-Nexis 
141 See Appendix A for coding procedure.	  
72 RES PUBLICA 	  
The first measure I use is essentially the method used by Binder in her analysis, 
which I term Simple Legislative Productivity. This score considers how effective the 
legislature was at dealing with all of the issues faced during the time period, without 
considering their relative importance. It is assumed that if the issue was important enough 
for an editorial to be written concerning the matter, the issue represented a problem to be 
faced.  
The second measure, which I refer to as Weighted Legislative Productivity, 
weighs each issue differently depending on how many editorials mentioned the issue.142 
This measure takes into account the salience of each issue; perhaps a state that is 
hampered by divided government or polarization cannot deal with the same number of 
issues, but it can still address the most pressing problems of the day. By using both 
measures of productivity, this approach allows such a distinction to be made and 
penalizes such a legislature less severely than one that addresses problems at random. 
 This method has the benefit of identifying the most politically salient issues, as 
well as going beyond a simple count of important legislation in a Mayhew-esque manner, 
which theoretically would be greater in larger state legislatures as compared to smaller 
ones. The methodology I utilize attempts to determine how much states had on their 
agendas during the time period studied, and then how much of that agenda they were able 
to respond to, a basic definition of legislative success.  
Furthermore, because the content and quality of the law is not what is being 
measured, fears of partisan sympathies on the part of the newspaper under question 
should not be an issue; as Mayhew described it in his work on divided government, a 
newspaper need not agree with an issue to deem it important enough to write about.143 On 
a theoretical level, editorials represent a sort of communal conversation about the 
political situations of the time, and just like a political conversation between people, 
topics will include both issues an editorial board supports and opposes. My coding 
                                                
142 To provide an example, if the issue of same-sex civil unions was mentioned in three 
editorials, for the first measure I would code simply whether a law was passed 
concerning same-sex civil unions, and it would represent one success among the total 
number of issues that had the potential of being addressed in law. For the second 
measure, I would code that as three successes, among the total number of issues by story 
mention that potentially could have been addressed in law. 
143 Mayhew 1991, 43 
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scheme looked only at what editorials were talking about, not what they wanted. I also 
create a dummy variable utilizing the newspaper slant scores developed by Shapiro and 
Gentzkow to use in my analysis, coded positively if the newspaper I use is biased towards 
the party in control of the legislature.144  
 The next step is quantifying the independent variables, polarization, divided 
government and majority party seat control. To operationalize polarization, I use the data 
from the ideal space estimation model created by Shor and McCarty.145 The two are able 
to map state legislators on a single-dimensional ideological spectrum utilizing roll call 
voting and survey responses from legislators both at the national and state level, allowing 
one to compare standardized scores for legislators across time and chambers. By 
comparing the difference in party ideological medians within each chamber and 
averaging the two, I come up with a measure of polarization for each state legislature. 
While my primary unit of analysis will be the state legislatures themselves, the ability to 
aggregate individual preferences into a total score that is directly comparable with other 
state legislatures (as well as Congress) provides a more precise measure of polarization 
than previous attempts at quantifying the concept.146 I conduct my analysis of state 
legislatures for the biennium from 2009 to 2010, since that is the most recent period that 
the majority of states had polarization data available.147  
 I then test whether polarization has the theorized negative effects, conditional on 
the presence of divided government, coded as a dummy variable (0 if one party controls 
both the governorship and both chambers of the legislature, 1 if otherwise). My first 
hypothesis is that polarization should have a negative effect on legislative productivity 
when combined with divided government, and either no effect or a positive effect during 
unified government. I also hypothesize that greater majority seat share (coded as the 
percent of seats in each chamber the largest party in the state controls, averaged across 
chambers) will likewise allow a majority party to accomplish more of its legislative 
                                                
144 Shapiro and Gentzkow 2010 
145 Shor and McCarty 2011	  
146 Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993; Berry et al. 1998 
147 Because the dataset is an ongoing work, for 12 of the 31 states the 2009-2010 data 
wasn’t complete. For these states, I utilize the closest year with complete data before 
2009, which was 2008 for all 12 states. Because the ideological medians change 
gradually over a large number of years, this shouldn’t significantly affect the results. 
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agenda. This should occur regardless of divided government. Under divided government, 
greater majority size should lead to increased likelihood of a veto override, and even 
under unified government a larger seat share prevents the minority party from making 
effective use of blocking mechanisms. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I measure the legislative productivity of 31 
states, and then assess the impact of polarization, divided government, and majority party 
seat share. My initial list of 31 states is diverse in population, average income, 
geographical location, and ideology.148 Particularly, I wanted a mix of divided versus 
unified control of government. Table 2 provides the relative frequencies of divided 
government for all state legislatures from 2009-2010,149 compared to my sample of 31. In 
addition, 13 of the states in my sample were below the median level of polarization, and 
18 were above. Unfortunately, for four out of the eight states that had divided partisan 
control of the two chambers, no newspaper sources were available in the databases used, 
preventing me from being fully able to test whether having a unified legislature against 
the party of the governor had a differential effect on legislative productivity than a 
divided legislature.  
 
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Partisan Control of Government, All States (excl. 
Nebraska) Compared to Sample 
 All states 31 state sample 
Unified Government 26 (53%) 19 (61%) 
Divided Branches Only 15 (31%) 8 (26%) 
Divided Chambers 8 (16%) 4 (13%) 
Total 49 (100%) 27 (100%) 
 
                                                
148 For a full list of the states examined, as well as further descriptive statistics, see 
Appendix B. 
149 Excluding Nebraska, a unicameral legislature which for comparability purposes is 
excluded from consideration in my analysis. 
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I create legislative productivity scores for each state, both the previously used 
simple legislative productivity, as well as the weighted productivity score which takes 
into account the relative salience of each issue and how effectively each legislature 
was able to deal with these more important issues. Notably, while there is some 
difference, the two measures track each other very closely; the Pearson’s r for the simple 
and weighted scores is a .903, indicating that the weighted legislative productivity score 
is a valid alternative measure of productivity. In addition, the agenda size is not 
correlated with how efficient a legislature was at responding to issues; when either the 
number of issues or the number of issue mentions are inserted into the main regression, 
neither variable is significant. As shown in Table 3, the only significant correlations with 
unique issues and issue mentions were population size and average income, suggesting 
that the more people (and how relatively affluent they were) were the main determinants 
behind a larger agenda size. Furthermore, when a variable is created indicating whether 
the legislature is controlled by the same party that the newspaper is biased towards, 
neither the simple nor weighted score is significantly correlated with the slant benefit, 
providing additional confidence in the accuracy of the measure.150 
 
Table 3: Pearson Bivariate Correlations Between Unique Issues/Issue Mentions Per 
State and Demographic Data. 
 
With both of these legislative productivity scores, it is then possible to develop a 
series of ordinary least squares regression models to estimate the impacts of divided 
government, polarization, and majority party seat share, as well as the interaction 
                                                
150 Pearson Correlation p-values between slant benefit and the two scores are .305 and 
.314 respectively.	  
 Total 
Population 
Average Annual Income 
Number of Unique 
Issues 
.389* .421* 
Number of Issue 
Mentions 
.358* .435* 
*p<.05, ** p<.01   N=31  
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between divided government and polarization. Table 4 reports the coefficients (standard 
errors in parentheses) and two-tailed significance of the aforementioned variables using 
both the simple and weighted productivity scores as a dependent variable.  
 
Table 4: OLS Models of Simple and Weighted Legislative Productivity. 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables 
Simple Legislative 
Productivity 
Weighted Legislative 
Productivity 
Majority Party Seat 
Share 
 
.440* 
(.204) 
.632* 
(.240) 
Polarization 
 
.156* 
(.060) 
.210** 
(.071) 
Divided Government 
 
.168 
(.127) 
.219  
(.149) 
Divided Government 
and Polarization 
Interaction 
 
-.203* 
(.080) 
-.248* 
(.094) 
Adjusted R2 .419 .443 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
 
  N=31 
The results from the two specifications of the model using the separate measures 
of legislative productivity are quite similar, not unexpected given the close correlation 
between the two scores but providing additional confidence in the robustness of the 
results. In addition a Goldfeld-Quandt test for heteroscedasticity fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity,151 providing assurance that the varying amount of issue 
mentions in the weighted legislative productivity model isn’t affecting the results of the 
                                                
151 95% confidence level; Fc=5.0 
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regression. While the findings from both specifications of the model are similar, the R2 of 
the weighted legislative productivity model is slightly higher, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is greater for each variable, and polarization registers at a higher level of 
significance than the simple legislative productivity model, suggesting that taking relative 
issue salience into account provides a similar but improved picture of legislative 
productivity. 
Turning to the hypotheses, all three variables have statistically significant effects, 
with the coefficients in the expected direction, although divided government only has an 
effect through its interaction with polarization. When divided government is not present 
and coded as zero, the interaction term drops out of the equation and polarization actually 
has a significant positive effect on legislative productivity. Similar to what McCarty 
suggests is the case at the national level,152 polarization in the states can under certain 
circumstance prove beneficial to the legislative process; namely, when both chambers 
and the governor are controlled by a single party. This effect is bolstered by large 
majority size, as the positive coefficient in front of majority party seat share 
demonstrates. However, under divided government, the positive effects of polarization 
are negated – combining the coefficients for polarization and the interaction term reveals 
it actually has a small negative effect on legislative productivity. Finally, divided 
government’s lack of a significant effect as an individual variable reveals that divided 
government, absent polarization, fails to present a substantial obstacle to legislative 
productivity.  
This result could help explain the discrepancy between Mayhew’s 1991 null 
finding on the relation between divided government and gridlock, and later analyses that 
have demonstrated such a link exists. As many political scientists have noted,153 elite 
polarization started rapidly increasing during the 1990s and has continued on to today, 
where it remains at an apex unreached since the turn of the previous century. Assuming 
that the findings from this cross-sectional model of legislatures would apply similarly to 
Congress, the recent increase in polarization would lead directly to less productive 
                                                
152 McCarty 2007	  
153	  Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006; McCarty 2007; Shor and McCarty 2011 
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instances of divided government compared to unified government, a difference that 
would not have occurred in times of less polarization.  
CONCLUSION 
 The preceding analysis provides strong support for the idea that it is critical to 
take into account not just inter-institutional conflict (divided government) and intra-
institutional conflict (polarization), but also the ways that the two interact with each 
other. When polarization is low, the difference for a legislature between negotiating with 
a governor from the opposite party versus the same party is relatively minor, and thus low 
levels of inter-institutional conflict mean divided government has little consequence for 
legislative productivity. However, when elite polarization is high, negotiating across 
party lines becomes more conflictual. Conflict is not all bad, however; in times of unified 
government, the higher stakes posed by polarized conditions can lead to increased 
productivity. This is especially true when the majority party has a larger number of seats 
under its control in the legislature, as the minority party has fewer options available to 
block the majority’s agenda. 
This paper does what others have not - testing polarization’s effects broadly 
across policy areas, taking into account issue salience and weighting accordingly, and 
looking at a large sample of the state legislatures. Worth noting is that Kousser, who 
similarly uses a methodology based on Binder’s, found in his single-state analysis that 
polarization alone fails to lead to any decrease in productivity, but that the combined 
presence of polarization and divided government are when gridlock is most likely to 
occur.154 This research provides empirical evidence that a similar effect can be found in a 
majority of the states. 
Another important innovation this paper provides that can be utilized in future 
research on legislative productivity is the idea that measuring productivity using a graded 
scale of issue salience allows for a more accurate modeling of real world legislatures. 
While the difference is small, the model utilizing such a weighted measure does a better 
job of explaining the variation in legislative productivity than the previously used simple 
measure does, and is more sensitive to the effects of the explanatory variables. More 
importantly, on a theoretical basis, it allows for one to make distinctions between the 
                                                
154 Kousser 2010	  
RES PUBLICA 79 	  
relatively minor agenda issues that may surface briefly, and the major policy issues that 
can represent the primary goals of an entire legislative session. Despite this improvement, 
even the model using weighted legislative productivity is only able to explain 
approximately half of the variance in productivity; while this might be unsurprising given 
the state-specific factors that likely exist, it also indicates that significantly more work 
investigating the determinants of legislative productivity is necessary. 
 Finally, this research only looks at a relatively short time period of two years, so it 
is possible that in different time periods inter-institutional and intra-institutional factors 
have different effects on legislative productivity. While perhaps there were stresses on 
the legislative system following a recession, or some other idiosyncrasy of this era played 
a role, a different method enabling the study of state level legislative productivity both 
over time and across states could help negate these concerns.  
Absent more solid evidence to call these findings into doubt, however, this paper 
provides solid evidence for a more nuanced view of how polarization can operate, both 
positively and negatively, and the role divided government plays in that determination. 
By taking into account both inter- and intra-institutional conflict and ways the two 
concepts work together, it is possible to come to a clearer understanding of the primary 
obstacles to legislative productivity. 
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